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L’analisi teorica discute gli effetti di un’unione monetaria (UM) sulle strategie di
negoziazione salariale, utilizzando un modello a due paesi. I risultati sono ottenuti confrontando
l’equilibrio di queste economie prima e dopo l’UM.
Nel modello proposto l’UM porta ogni sindacato a tenere conto della risposta della politica
monetaria ai propri incrementi salariali in misura minore rispetto alla situazione precedente; questo
perché l’inflazione obiettivo della banca centrale nell’UM è una media ponderata dell’inflazione in
ciascuno dei paesi membri. Ciò riduce la reazione della politica monetaria alle azioni del singolo
sindacato, e quindi la percezione, da parte di quest’ultimo, delle ripercussioni inflazionistiche delle
proprie azioni. Pertanto, se la contrattazione avviene in modo non coordinato tra i diversi sindacati,
l’UM potrebbe indurre una minore moderazione salariale. L’analisi mostra inoltre che tale riduzione
avviene solamente nel caso in cui i sindacati siano sufficientemente grandi e abbiano potere di
mercato; nel caso limite di sindacati atomistici, l’UM non esercita alcun effetto sulla contrattazione
salariale. Il modello teorico suggerisce infine che l’effetto dell’UM sulla negoziazione salariale
potrebbe essere maggiore nei paesi più piccoli.
I risultati del modello dipendono da alcune ipotesi chiave. La prima è che l’UM non alteri le
caratteristiche strutturali delle economie in questione, quali ad esempio il grado di concorrenza sul
mercato del lavoro, che potrebbe invece risentire di un aumento della concorrenza nel mercato dei
beni derivante dalla moneta unica. La seconda è che i salari siano contrattati in modo non
coordinato: ciascun sindacato non valuta che la propria scelta sarà seguita da comportamenti
analoghi da parte degli altri sindacati. Se i salari vengono determinati in modo coordinato, l’UM
non ha effetti sulle strategie contrattuali. Infine, il modello non considera che, in seguito alla
scomparsa della politica monetaria nazionale, i sindacati potrebbero essere indotti a comportamenti
di maggior moderazione nella contrattazione salariale perché percepirebbero come maggiormente
costosa la perdita di competitività associata a un’elevata crescita salariale./$%25 0$5.(76 $1' 021(7$5< 81,21 $ 675$7(*,& $1$/<6,6
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This paper analyzes the macroeconomic consequences of the establishment of a
monetary union in the presence of unionized labor markets. It is shown that the effects
of the formation of a monetary union depend on several labor market features, such as
the degree of centralization of wage bargaining, labor unions’i n À ation aversion and the
degree of substitutability between the labor of different unions. In particular, the switch
from national monetary policies to a uni¿ed monetary policy usually affects both inÀation
and unemployment, even when all structural parameters of the economy and of unions’ and
policymakers’ preferences remainthesame. Thebenchmark caseof amonetary unionbetween
identical countries suggests that the switch to a monetary union is likely to make labor unions
more aggressive, increasing unemployment. Quali¿cations to this result are provided and
their robustness is investigated under alternative structural assumptions, like cross-country
asymmetries, (pre-union) ERM membership and wage leadership.
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1
This paper investigates the effects of the establishment of a monetary union on real
wages, inÀation and unemployment in the presence of unionized labor markets. Conventional
wisdomasembodiedintheneutralityofmoneyparadigmwouldseemto suggestthat, provided
there are no additional structural changes, the formation of a monetary union (MU) SHU VH
should not affect real variables. However, this point of view abstracts from changes in the
strategic interaction between non-atomistic labor unions and the central bank brought about
by the formation of a monetary union.
We show that in the presence of such interaction the formation of a MU changes the
equilibrium values of inÀation, real wages and unemployment. In particular, the shift to a MU
affects unemployment and inÀation in the countries that form the union even when none of
the structural features of those countries, such as the level of central bank independence and
the organization of labor markets, changes with the formation of the MU. A basic mechanism
driving these results is that with the formation of the MU all unions become smaller units of a
broader monetary area. This reduces their perception of the inÀationary repercussions of their
individual wages, inducing them to be more aggressive in their wage demands. In broader
terms, those results are due to the fact that once the endogenous nature of monetary policy is
acknowledged the natural rate of unemployment is no longer independent of the structure of
monetary institutions if wage setting is done by non-atomistic unions.
2
The arguments developed here are based on the analytical framework developed in
Cukierman and Lippi (1999), amended to allow for cross-country asymmetries in wage-setting
structures. In this framework there are three key parameters that characterize the structure of
labor markets: the centralization of wage bargaining, the substitutability between the labor
4 We thank Anne Sibert and Henrik Jensen for useful suggestions on a previous version of the paper. We
also bene¿ted from the comments of Ignazio Angeloni and of seminar participants at the European Central Bank,
Banca d’Italia, Bocconi University, Banque de France, the EEA Congress at Santiago de Compostela, the XII
Meeting of the International Economic Association in Buenos Aires. Email: lippi@dada.it
5 The essence of our formal argument has also been noticed in policy circles. In a recent report on wage
setting and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) the Economic Policy Committee of the European Com-
mission (1998) wrote: “the change in the monetary regime with the move to EMU could potentially change the
economic agents’ behaviour. Before EMU those countries having a centralised/co-ordinated system of wage bar-
gaining could have expected a ’national’ policy response following their wage agreements. Under EMU things
might be different. The impact on inÀation of one country would inÀuence EUR11-wide inÀation according to
this country’s weight in the EUR11 inÀation rate. [..] Hence, the ’burden’ of the ECB’s tighter monetary policy
[..] would be externalised to an important extent” (p.7).8




monetary policy or there is a uni¿ed monetary policy for all countries under consideration.
More precisely, two alternative policy regimes are considered: (i) national monetary policies
and (ii) monetary union.
The main results of the paper are derived by comparing the equilibria obtained under a
MU with those obtained under national monetary policies (NMP). This is done by considering
a two-stage strategic interaction between a central bank (CB) and a number of unions. In the
¿rst stage each union in each country sets its own nominal wage taking the nominal wages of
other unions and the reaction-function of the CB as given. In the second stage, of the NMP
regime, the CB in each country chooses inÀation, so as to minimize the combined costs of
inÀation and of unemployment, taking unions’ nominal wage rates as given. Under the MU
regime, a single monetary authority chooses the area-wide inÀa t i o ni nt h es e c o n ds t a g ea n d
this is known by all unions in the ¿rst stage. The analysis focuses initially on the impacts
of the formation of a MU in the benchmark case in which the parameters of all countries are
identical. This is followed by a more detailed study of the variation in these impacts with the
relative sizes of member countries and with the relative degrees of centralization of their labor
markets.
4
This paper is closely related to a recent paper by Grüner and Hefeker (1999). However,
while they focus on the special case of a single union that encompasses the whole labor force,
we develop the analysis for any number of labor unions within each country. The analysis
reveals that there are substantial differences between the monopoly union case and the multi-
union case, the most signi¿cant of which is that, in the presence of more than one union, the
change in monetary regime leads to changes in UHDO variables even if unions are QRW inÀation
averse. Soskice and Iversen (1998) also analyze the effects of the establishment of a MU on
6 The presumption that unions are averse to inÀation has gained acceptability during the nineties. A non
exhaustive list of references that assume unions to be inÀation averse includes Agell and Ysander (1993), Cubitt
(1992), Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Grüner and Hefeker (1999), Guzzo and Velasco (1999), Gylfason and
Lindbeck (1994), Jensen (1997), Skott (1997) and Yashiv (1989).
7 We deliberately abstract from open-economy spillovers of the type studied by Jensen (1993) and Zer-
voyianni (1997) in order to focus on the effects of a MU originating from changes in the strategic environment
faced by unions. Holden (1998) develops a related open-economy model in which the monetary framework has
systematic effects on employment.9
wage bargaining in the countries of the Euro area. Although the model they use is different
from ours, the results of the two papers are broadly similar. One notable difference is that they
consider the effects of a MU among LGHQWLFDO economies each of which has a IXOO\ centralized
wage-settingprocess, whileweallowforcross-countrydifferencesinthenumberofunionsand
in other structural parameters.
5 This allows us to study how the effects of the MU vary across
the participating countries, depending on country size and on the degrees of centralization of
national labor markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic analytical framework
and characterizes equilibrium in each country under a regime of NMP. Equilibrium in a two-
country MU is derived in Section 3. The impact of the formation of a MU on employment,
real wages and inÀation is discussed in Section 4. Three particular cases are studied: the
¿rst considers identical countries the second allows for cross-country asymmetries in the
degrees of labor market competitiveness and the third considers the case of labor unions that
are indifferent to inÀation. Section 5 discusses the effects of the formation of a MU under
two alternative structural assumptions, which may be relevant for Europe. The ¿rst relates
to the fact that several countries were in a regime of unilateral pegs before entering the MU,
rather than in a regime of independent NMP. The second modi¿es the Nash wage bargaining
framework used in the previous sections in order to allow for wage-leadership by the unions
of one country. This is followed by concluding remarks.
 /DERU PDUNHWV DQG PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ XQGHU QDWLRQDO PRQHWDU\ SROLFLHV
6
A representative national economy consists of ? independent unions and of a CB whose
degree of inÀation aversion is characterized by a parameter U.
7 A typical union, , prefers a
8 Another important difference is that in our model the reaction function of the central bank is derived ex-
plicitly from the objectives and constraints of the monetary authorities and is therefore endogenous. By contrast
in Soskice and Iversen (1998) the policy rule for the money supply is postulated exogenously (see their Mathe-
matical Appendix, p.123).
9 Since the analytical framework for a single country is borrowed from Cukierman and Lippi (1999) it is
presented rather brieÀy. The interested reader may ¿nd further details concerning the mechanics and intuition of
this model in the above paper.
: An independent union is a union that has the authority to decide its wage policy in an independent manner.10
higher real wage rate (o￿) for its members, dislikes unemployment among its members and
dislikes inÀation. This is captured by the following loss function:




where ￿ is the rate of unemployment among members of union , Z  R  R3￿ is the rate of
inÀation (de¿ned as the difference between adjacent values of the log of the price level) and
 and  are positive parameters. The ¿rst two arguments reÀect the union’s sectorial interest
and are conventional in the theory of trade unions’ behavior.
8 The third one reÀects the union’s
aversion to inÀation.
9
The CB dislikes both aggregate unemployment ()a n di n À ation. More precisely, the




where U is a measure of the relative inÀation aversion of the CB. This parameter is Rogoff’s
(1985) well known degree of (multiplicative) CB conservativeness. We consider a two-stage
game and solve it by backward induction. In the second stage, the CB chooses inÀation, taking
the nominal wages previously set by all the unions as given, so as to minimize its loss function.
In the ¿rst stage each union chooses its nominal wage rate so as to minimize the loss function
in equation (1), taking the nominal wage rates chosen by all other unions and the subsequent
central bank reaction as given.
2.1 7KH ODERU PDUNHW
Total labor supply in the economy is u. All labor is (effectively) unionized and is HYHQO\
distributed over ? unions. Although the labor of any given union can be usefully employed in
; See for example Oswald (1982).
< This is at least partly due to the fact that the income, pensions and other wealth of union members are
not fully indexed. Grüner and Hefeker (1999) report that the representatives of German labor unions recently
demanded that inÀation continue to be low in the newly formed European Monetary Union.11
all industries it is not perfectly substitutable for the labor of other unions.
10 Labor of a given
union is supplied completely inelastically and is mobile across industries. The demand for the










￿ is demand for the labor of that union, o￿ is the (logarithm) of the real wage obtained




? is the (arithmetic) mean of o￿ over all unions in the
economy. This demand function states that the share (in total labor force) of labor demand
facing union  is decreasing in its own real wage and increasing in the average real wage in







￿ ' kE_  ou (4)
Equation (4) states that aggregate demand for labor depends (negatively) RQO\ on the
DYHUDJH real wage o. In particular, aggregate demand for labor GRHV QRW depend on the
number of unions in the economy. Equation (3) implies that any union that sets its real wage
equal to the average real wage in the economy obtains *? of aggregate labor demand. When
it sets the real wage above (below) the mean wage its total share of aggregate demand is lower
(higher) than *?. But since labor is differentiated deviations in the real wage of a particular
union from the economy-wide average do not induce a total loss of demand or an in¿nite
demand. For a given number of unions the parameter  measures the degree of substitutability
between the labor of different unions.
Equation (3) implies that the absolute value of the elasticity of labor demand facing
union , #￿, with respect to the (level of the) real wage set by the union is:
#￿ '
k n E?  
kE_  o￿?Eo￿ o
 (5)
43 The notion underlying this speci¿cation is that labor is generally differentiated.12
In a symmetric equilibrium (where all unions choose the same wage) this elasticity is
increasing in the degree of decentralization of wage bargaining, as measured by ?.
11 Thus,
equation (3) implies that, although WRWDO labor demand does not depend on the degree of
centralization of wage bargaining, the extent of wage competition among unions is greater
when the labor force is spread over a larger number ofbargaining units. This is the competition
effect of more decentralization discussed by Calmfors and Drif¿ll (1988) and Calmfors (1993).
2.2 7KH FHQWUDO EDQN SUREOHP
In the second stage of the game, the monetary authority chooses the inÀation rate after
nominal wages have been set in stage one. We thus focus on discretionary monetary policy.
Reformulating the labor demand equation in terms of nominal wages and inÀa t i o nl e a d st ot h e











? is the average nominal wage, R3￿ is the (log of) previous-period price
level, ￿  o￿ nR and S
o  _  ￿
k is the market clearing real wage (at which  'f ).
12 The
central bank problem in the domestic country is to choose the inÀation rate that minimizes the







o  R3￿ (7)
Equation (7) canbe rewritten, splitting the nominal wage into its real andexpected price-
level components ( ' o n .R)a s :
44 The sign of the partial derivative of m with respect to q is determined by the sign of: +gzu,+zum
zu,which is positive if and only if: zum ? zu. ￿
￿+gzu,=Provided aggregate labor demand is positive, gzu
is positive as well, implying that as long as the real wage chosen by an individual union is not ”too much” above
the economy wide real wage m is increasing in q= This condition is always satis¿ed in a symmetric equilibrium.





E n .Z where   o  
S
o (8)
where the variable  is de¿ned as the average real wage premium in excess of the real
competitive wage and .Z is expected inÀation. Imposing the rational expectations condition





This equation con¿rms, within our multiunion framework, the well-known Kydland and
Prescott (1997) and Barro-Gordon (1983) result that inÀation is positive when the “natural”
unemployment rate is above the desired rate (zero in our case).
13 It also appears that, for a
given wage premium, inÀation decreases as central bank conservativeness (characterized by
U increases.
2.3 :DJHVHWWLQJ
In the ¿rst stage each union chooses the nominal wage ￿ that minimizes the loss
function (1), taking the nominal wages of other unions and the reaction function of monetary
policy to nominal wages (7) as given. Assuming, for simplicity, that all unions within each
country are identical in size, each of them has a total labor supply equal to u￿ ' u*?.T h e
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S
on?E￿  7  (10)
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46 Unemployment is positive when the real wage exceeds the competitive benchmark level (i.e. if
!A3 ).14
where . is the expectations operator. The ¿rst order condition for the typical union’s problem
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Summing over all unions and dividing equation (12) by ? yields the equilibrium real wage
premium (recall that     .RS








E  ~￿ k
U n dk~￿ n E? o
 ' 
￿
￿ c ' ? (13)
This is also the wage premium of each individual union, since the problem is symmetric.
Note that the wage premium is lower, and employment higher, the higher the parameters and
. ~￿ is the impact of a one unit increase in the nominal wage rate on the typical union’s real
wage rate, under NMP, taking into consideration the reaction function of the CB. Thus~￿ is a
measure of the effectiveness of changes in the nominal wage in bringing about changes in the
real wage. For ¿nite values of CB conservativeness and of the number of unions this parameter
is smaller than one. This implies that in order to raise its real wage by one unit the union has
to raise its nominal wage rate by more than one unit. The expression for ~￿ suggests that
this effectiveness parameter is lower the smaller the number of unions and the more liberal is
the CB (the lower is U). It can be shown that, other things being equal, the wage premium
is an increasing function of ~￿ Substituting the expression for ~￿ into equation (13) and




U dE?  k2 n ?Uo
kik￿ nU dkEE?  k2 n ?UnE ??Ek2 n Uoj
' 
￿
￿ c ; 
￿r (14)15
2.4 0DFUR RXWFRPHV XQGHU QDWLRQDO PRQHWDU\ SROLFLHV
The equilibrium rates of unemployment and of inÀation are, from equations (6) and (9),










so are unemployment and inÀation. The former is a consequence of the fact that each union
is willing to inÀict some unemployment on its members in order to raise the real wage
of employed members above the competitive level. The latter is due to the policymaker’s
incentives under discretionary policy. Simple comparative statics of the equilibrium wage
premium reveal some basic properties of the model. They are summarized in the following
four propositions:
14
Proposition 1 7KH PRUH XQLRQV FDUH DERXW SULFH VWDELOLW\  DQGRU WKH KLJKHU LV
VXEVWLWXWDELOLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH ODERU RI GLIIHUHQW XQLRQV  WKH ORZHU LV WKH HTXLOLEULXP UHDO
ZDJH SUHPLXP DQG FRUUHVSRQGLQJO\ WKH ORZHU DUH WKH UDWHV RI XQHPSOR\PHQW DQG RI LQÀDWLRQ
Unions’ concern with price stability PRGHUDWHV their wage demands. The reason is that
each union realizes that by raising its real wage it increases the CB incentives to inÀate in order
to reduce unemployment. When unions dislike inÀation, this recognition of CB incentives
moderates wage demands. The moderating effect is stronger when the number of unions is
small.
















where ( is the expression in the curly bracket appearing in the denominator of (14). This leads
to:
47 Empirical evidence and a fuller discussion of the features of equilibrium outcomes under the NMP regime
are provided in Cukierman and Lippi (1999).16
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Y ￿
￿
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Y? 	 fDW KLJK ?
Changes in ? trigger two opposite effects on real wages, unemployment and inÀation.
The increase in the number of unions increases the substitutability between the labor of
different unions and therefore the degree of effective competition between them. This
“increased competition effect” lowers real wages, unemployment and inÀation. But the
increase in the number of unions also reduces the moderating effect of inÀationary fears on
the real wage demands of each union. This “strategic effect” raises real wages, unemployment
and inÀation. Part L of Proposition 2 states that when unions’ concern for price stability is
below a certain threshold, the ¿rst effect dominates and hence unemployment and inÀation are
decreasing in the number of unions. The second part of Proposition 2 states that, when unions’
aversion to inÀation is above the threshold, the strategic effect dominates the competition
effect at low levels of ?, thus producing a Calmfors - Drif¿ll relation between real wages
and the number of independent unions. The threshold S 
￿U2￿
k￿ implies that an inverted U
relation between real wages and centralization (the reciprocal of ?) is more likely to arise the
lower is the substitutability between the labor of different unions (lower ), the lower is U and
the less unions care about unemployment among their members (the lower is ).
A third feature of the equilibrium is that the structure of monetary policy institutions
affects real macroeconomic variables such as unemployment. The understanding of
the mechanism through which monetary policy inÀuences unemployment is crucial to
understanding the workings of the MU described in the next section. Since the effect
of monetary policy on employment is due to the strategic interaction between unions and
monetary authorities, we refer to those non-neutralities as “strategic”. Differentiating (14)
















Proposition 3 $Q LQFUHDVH LQ WKH GHJUHH RI FHQWUDO EDQN FRQVHUYDWLYHQHVV UDLVHV WKH UDWH RI
XQHPSOR\PHQW LI DW OHDVW RQH RI WKH IROORZLQJ FRQGLWLRQV KROGV17
L :fXQLRQV DUH DYHUVH WR LQÀDWLRQ
LL :fDQG ?:WKHUH DUH DW OHDVW WZR XQLRQV DQG VRPH GHJUHH RI VXEVWLWXWDELOLW\ LQ
WKH GHPDQG IRU WKHLU ODERU
$V XQLRQV EHFRPH DWRPLVWLF ? $4  WKLV HIIHFW EHFRPHV QHJOLJLEOH
The two conditions in the proposition correspond to two different kinds of strategic non-
neutralities. The ¿rst operates through trade unions’ concern about price stability (:f ).
It is due to the fact that the higher CB conservativeness, the smaller are the inÀationary
consequences of a higher wage premium. Hence a more conservative central bank induces
unions to demand higher real wages (as this triggers a milder inÀationary reaction by the CB).
Provided there is more than one union in the economy, there is a second source of
“strategic non-neutrality” which operates even when unions are not concerned with price
stability ( 'f ). It is due to the fact that under nominal contracting, the marginal tradeoff
between the real wage and the relative wage for an individual union depends on the level
of CBI. More precisely, the marginal impact of a unit increase in a union’s nominal wage
rate on its real wage depends (positively) on CBI whereas its impact on the relative wage
does not. As a consequence, to obtain a unit increase in its real wage rate, the union has to
accept an increase in its relative wage that is larger the smaller CBI. Thus, a less inÀation-
averse central bank leads unions to perceive a given increase in their own real wage as more
costly in terms of competitiveness (relative wage). This DGYHUVH FRPSHWLWLYH HIIHFW moderates
unions’ real wage demands and increases with the degree of substitutability between the labor
of different unions (). This second non-neutrality contrasts with most of the literature on
monetary policy games under perfect information in which (when unions are indifferent to
inÀation)CBIaffectsinÀation but doesnotaffectrealvariables. Neutrality reappears, however,
even when conditions L and LL hold, when ? is large since in this case each individual union
basically neglects the effect of its own actions on inÀation.
15
48 This can be seen by noting that expression (17) converges to zero as q tends to in¿nity (a higher power of
q appears in the denominator than in the numerator).18
 $ WZRFRXQWU\ PRQHWDU\ XQLRQ
The basic issue addressed in this section is whether the strategic linkages between the
choices of wage-setters and those of the CB imply that the establishment of a MU alters
the equilibrium values of inÀation and of other variables in the participating countries. To
determine whether there are such effects we start by considering the simple benchmark case of
a MU between two identical countries (i.e. with the same structural parameters and the same
agents’ preferences). In order to focus on the direct effects of a MU we also assume that the
establishment of a MU does not cause any changes in the pre-MU parameters (including the
CB inÀation aversion). Finally, it is assumed that all unions set wages simultaneously, i.e. no
union (or country) is a leader in wage setting. The consequences of partial relaxation of this
assumption are studied in Subsection 5.2.
It would seem at ¿rst blush that, under the above conditions, the shift to a MU should
not affect real variables. This at least is the implication of a standard Barro-Gordon framework
in which unions’ choices are not modeled explicitly. As we shall see, however, the result is
differentifaccountistakenoftradeunions’incentives. TheformationofaMUunambiguously
reduces the impact of each union’s wage decisions on the subsequent rate of inÀation. This
happens because the number of unions interacting with the central bank is larger in the MU.
When a typical union is concerned about inÀation, a decrease in its relative size diminishes
its perception of how much inÀation is caused by its individual wage choice. This leads to a
higher wage premium and therefore to higher unemployment and inÀation.
The total direct effect of a MU on unions’ behavior is likely to depend on several
parameters, such as the relative size of the countries joining the MU and the inÀation aversion
of the single central bank. A more precise analytical framework is therefore needed to assess
the relative importance of those effects. Such a framework follows.
3.1 $ VLPSOH PRQHWDU\ XQLRQ PRGHO
We consider two countries named 1 and 2 with total labor supplies given by u￿ and u2.
Countries are allowed to differ in the size of their laborforce (u￿), in number of unions (?￿)an d
in the degree of substitutability between the labor of different unions within a given country19








E_  ￿￿ n Z n R3￿  ￿E￿￿  ￿

u￿ (18)
where the previous-period price level R3￿ is, without loss of generality, assumed to be the same
across countries.
16 The labor demand speci¿cation in (18) is equivalent to (3). This reÀects
our presumption that, at least to a ¿rst approximation, the formation of a MU does not alter
the degree of competition in the labor market.
17 The aggregate unemployment rate in the area
is therefore given by:
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where r￿  u￿




u￿ is country’s  rate of unemployment and u_L
￿ is total demand for labor in country
. The competitive real wage level is the same in the two countries, as the structural parameters
that determine it are, for simplicity, assumed to be the same. Hence S
o  _ ￿
k as in section 2.
Using equation (6) for the unemployment rate in each country, the area-wide unemployment











with L  r￿L
￿ n r2L
2 .
18 The loss function of the single central bank in the MU is given
by equation (2) where the inÀation and unemployment arguments are now the corresponding
area-wide measures. The monetary policy authority’s reaction function, which in terms of
area-wide variables is identical to (7), can be rewritten as:
49 Given that countries in the MU have the same inÀation rate , a common price level, s> for both countries
is obtained by normalizing one of the previous-period price indices, sl>￿4> to the level of the other (assumed to
be the new common currency).
4: Competition might increase in the MU if labor substitutability increases owing to higher labor or capital
mobility in the MU. This view is stressed, among others, by Burda (1999).
4; Obviously v5 @4v 4in the two-country MU we study here. However, the model can be easily extended















Union  in country  minimizes the loss function (1) subject to (10) and to (21), taking
the nominal wages of the other unions, both at home and abroad, as given. Algebraic
manipulations of a typical Country 2 union’s ¿rst order condition make it possible to write
the average wage premium in Country 2 in terms of the average wage premium in Country
1. Given that within each country unions are symmetric the premium requested by each
individual union within a given country is identical to the country’s average. In the MU regime
(superscript U), the reaction function of the average wage premium in Country 2 to the average
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Since we are assuming that unions move simultaneously in all countries an expression
analogous to (22) holds for the average wage premium of Country 1 in terms of the average
wage premium of Country 2. It appears from (22) that trade unions’ concern about inÀation
(:f )FUHDWHV interdependencies between the UHDO wages of the member countries. These
cross effects are obviously absent under a regime of national monetary policies.
19 Since the
average wage premium of Country 1 inÀuences the single monetary policy and therefore the
area-wide inÀation rate, unions in Country 2 take account of that when setting wages. In
particular, wage premia turn out to be VWUDWHJLF VXEVWLWXWHV since a higher average wage
premium in one country raises the area-wide inÀation and therefore induces unions in the
other country to moderate their wage demands.
4< When E @3there is no link between the UHDO wages of unions across different countries, but there
is a link between the QRPLQDO wages of the two countries under MU (this is demonstrated in Subsection 5.2).
Intuitively, this occurs because higher nominal wages in one country tend to increase the area-wide inÀation.
Therefore, unions in the other country increase their nominal wages in order to maintain their (individually
optimal) equilibrium real wage.21










Proposition 4 7KH UHDFWLRQ RI ZDJHV LQ &RXQWU\  ³GRPHVWLF´ WR ZDJHV LQ &RXQWU\ 
³IRUHLJQ´ LV DOPRVW QLO LI
L XQLRQV LQ WKH GRPHVWLF FRXQWU\ DUH DWRPLVWLF ?2 $4 
LL WKH UHODWLYH GLPHQVLRQ RI WKH GRPHVWLF FRXQWU\ LQ WKH 08 LV YHU\ VPDOO r2  f
LLL WKH UHODWLYH GLPHQVLRQ RI WKH IRUHLJQ FRXQWU\ LQ WKH 08 LV YHU\ VPDOO r￿  f
LY WKH LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ RI WKH FHQWUDO EDQN LV YHU\ KLJK U $4 
Intuitively, in cases (L and (LL each union in Country 2 is essentially atomistic in the
MU (i.e. it does not internalize the inÀationary reaction of the CB to its wage decisions) and
hence ignores foreign wages as well. Under case (LLL there is no reaction to foreign wages
as these are nearly irrelevant to the determination of MU-wide inÀation. In case (LY the CB
is so conservative that it keeps inÀation low at DOO levels of wages. Hence unions can ignore
inÀation and indulge in their sectorial interests completely freely.




2 are given by the point where the reaction









The equilibrium value for the wage premium in Country 1 is given by the following expression
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Simple algebra reveals that expression (23) reduces to (13) when r￿ '(hence r2 'f )
which is the case of a national monetary policy by Country 1. It also appears from this22
expression that, as unions of country  become atomistic (i.e. ?￿ $4 ,' c 2 ), the
wage premia converge to zero irrespective of the monetary regime and country size. Thus,
the orthogonality between UHDO labor market outcomes and the monetary regime, which one
wouldexpectonthebasisofaconventionalmoney-neutralityargument, isobtainedasa special
case in our model when the labor market is competitive or nearly competitive. The following
section considers three simple instances of a MU in which this “traditional” neutrality result
no longer obtains because unions are non-atomistic.
 7KH HIIHFWV RI D PRQHWDU\ XQLRQ VRPH VSHFL¿F FDVHV
Equations (22) and (23) reveal that the establishment of a MU induces complex
interactions between wages in the two countries. Those interactions depend on the number
of trade unions, country size, union preferences, labor substitutability in each country and the
conservativeness of the CB. In general, the outcomes of the model will vary depending on the
nature of structural differences between the countries forming the monetary union. To develop
some understanding of how those differences inÀuence the outcome we start from a simple
benchmark case, in which all countries have identical parameters, and move gradually to some
more complex cases.
In all these cases our aim is to analyze the GLUHFW effect of the MU on unions’ behavior,
i.e. to study the impact of the MU in comparison to outcomes obtained under the NMP regime.
This effect is “direct” in that it is based on the assumption that all relevant parameters are
unaltered by the formation of the MU. Formally, the direct effect of the formation of a MU




￿ for XQFKDQJHG underlying parameters.
20
Note that once this effect is known it is possible to determine the effects of the MU on the
rates of unemployment and inÀation in the two countries by comparing the expressions for
unemployment and inÀation under NMP (equation (15)) with their counterparts under MU.
Minor rearrangements of equations (20)and (21) imply that the expressions forunemployment
and inÀation under a MU are:
53 Obviously, additional macroeconomic effects of the type described (for an individual national economy)
in Section 2.4 occur if a country also experiences changes in some of its structural economic parameters. For
instance, the analysis can be readily extended to consider the effects of MU between two countries with different





















We start by analyzing the direct effect of a MU between two countries that are identical
in every respect. We then study the direct effect of the MU when the degree of labor
substitutability differs between the two countries. Third, we study the direct effect of the
MU under the assumption that unions are not inÀation averse ( 'f ). This last case is of
interest because it relates the results of our model to the numerous studies in which unions
are assumed not to care about inÀation. For this case we also analyze how the direct effects
of the MU vary with country size, the number of unions in each country and the degree of
competition in the labor market in each country.
4.1 $ PRQHWDU\ XQLRQ EHWZHHQ LGHQWLFDO FRXQWULHV
It is useful to begin the analysis from the case of a MU between countries that are
identical in their labor forces (r￿ ' r2 ' * 2c number of unions (?￿ ' ?2 ' ? and degree of
substitutability between labor E￿ ' 2 ' . In this case the premium demanded by unions
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To compare the value of the wage premium given by (26) with the value obtained under
the NMP regime (13) the latter can be conveniently rewritten as:
54 Since for this case ]X
4 @ ]X
5  ]X and KX
4 @ KX
5  KX> the wage premium under MU is the same
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￿￿  ' c2(  ' cc? ￿ (27)
(where M￿ and ~￿ are the NMP counterparts of ML and of ~L). Comparison of (26) with
(27) for identical values of ? and  immediately leads to:
Proposition 5 ,I XQLRQ DQG FHQWUDOEDQN SUHIHUHQFHV DUH LGHQWLFDO DFURVV FRXQWULHV DQG GR QRW
FKDQJH ZLWK WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI WKH 08 WKHQ WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP LQ WKH 08 LV KLJKHU WKDQ WKH
RQH REWDLQHG XQGHU 103 DW DOO OHYHOV RI ?
Intuitively, a typical individual union correctly perceives that the effect of a one-unit
increase in the nominal wage on its real wage is greater in the MU than in the NMP regime
(i.e. ~L :~ ￿). In this fully symmetric MU, the switch from the NMP to the MU regime
reduces the extent to which each union internalizes the inÀationary repercussions of its own
actions, thus raising ~. This alters union behavior via two separate channels. The ¿rst operates
through unions’ inÀation concern (:f ) and the second through a mitigation of the adverse
competitive effect of an increase in inÀation (when :fand ?: ). Hence the formation
of a MU leads to less moderation in unions’ real wage demands through both channels. The
upshot is that the switch from NMP to MU shifts the “Calmfors-Drif¿ll” curve upwards.
22
Given the macroeconomic linkages established in equation (24), this result means that both
inÀation and unemployment (in every country) are increased by the establishment of a MU.
4.2 'LIIHUHQFHV LQ ODERU PDUNHW FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV ￿ : 2
We now move from the fully symmetric benchmark case analyzed above to a somewhat
more general case in which the only structural difference between the countries that join
the MU concerns the degree of substitutability between the labor of different unions. For
concreteness, we assume that ￿ : 2, leaving all other country parameters identical.
23 This
implies that, as the substitutability of labor is higher in Country 1, effective competition
55 As suggested by Proposition 2, what we label as a “Calmfors - Drif¿ll” curve is not necessarily a hump-
shaped relation but may also be a monotonic relation between the wage premium and centralization.
56 Note that this implies that ]Q
4 @ ]Q
5 > and that ]X
4 @ ]X
5 > since it is still the case that v4 @ v5 @ 4
5 and
q4 @ q5.25
between unions is higher in that country and therefore, under NMP, the wage premium in
Country 1 is lower than that in Country 2.
24
Since ~L is the same in both countries, equation (23) implies that the wage premium in













As in the previous experiment, the direct effect of the establishment of a MU is obtained
by comparing the premium under NMP (27) with the premium under a MU (28). This leads
to the following (the proof appears in the appendix):
Proposition 6 ,I WKH GHJUHH RI FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV DFURVV XQLRQV LV KLJKHU LQ &RXQWU\  WKDQ LQ
&RXQWU\  ￿ : 2 WKHQ WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI D 08
L OHDGV WR D UHGXFWLRQ LQ WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP LQ &RXQWU\  SURYLGHG XQLRQV¶ LQÀDWLRQ
DYHUVLRQ  DQG WKH SRVLWLYH FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV GLIIHUHQFH E￿  2 DUH ERWK VXI¿FLHQWO\ ODUJH
2WKHUZLVH WKH SUHPLXP LQFUHDVHV
LL OHDGV WR DQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP RI &RXQWU\ 
The intuition underlying the proposition follows. Once in the MU, the relatively more
competitive unions of Country 1 are faced with the higher wage premium of the unions of
Country 2. As a consequence, at given pre-MU wage premia, the area-wide wage premium is
higher than the premium they faced before joining the MU. Taken in isolation, this effect tends
to raise the inÀationary response of the CB, inducing unions in Country 1 to moderate their
wage demands in order to avoid excessive inÀation. However, the formation of the MU also
reduces the relative size of each union in both countries. This raises ~ and induces each union
to demand a higher wage premium (this is the “direct” MU effect described in the previous
subsection). The ¿nal outcome of these contrasting effects on Country 1 wages depends on the
unions’ inÀation aversion. If they are highly averse to inÀation, the ¿rst effect dominates and
the establishment of a MU leads to a reduction in the average wage premium of the country
with the relatively more competitive labor market. The upshot is that the direct effect of the
57 This follows from Proposition 1.26
MU on the wage premium in the more competitive country depends on the degree of unions’
inÀation aversion.
The effect of the MU is unambiguous in the country with less competitive labor markets
(Country 2) since, at pre-MU real wages, labor unions there face a lower area-wide wage
premium than they faced before joining the MU. This creates an incentive to push up the wage
premium, on top of that triggered by the relatively smaller impact that unions’ wage decisions
exert on inÀation. Thus, the direct effect of the MU is to increases the wage premium in the
country with less competitive labor market, thereby raising the rate of unemployment in that
country.
4.3 $ 08 EHWZHHQ FRXQWULHV ZLWK KHWHURJHQHRXV VWUXFWXUHV r￿ 9' r2c? ￿ 9 '? 2c ￿ 9 ' 2
ZKHQ XQLRQV GR QRW FDUH DERXW SULFH VWDELOLW\  'f 
We now consider the direct effect of a MU in the case in which unions are not
inÀation averse. This allows us to study, albeit in a particular case, how the direct effect
of the establishment of a MU varies with country size, the differences between the degree
of competitiveness among unions in each country and differences across countries in the
centralization of wage bargaining. When  'fthe general expression for the wage premia of
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Comparison of the wage premium under MU with the corresponding premium under
NMP leads to the following proposition (the proof is in the appendix):
Proposition 7 ,I XQLRQV GR QRW FDUH DERXW SULFH VWDELOLW\  'f  WKHUH LV PRUH WKDQ RQH
XQLRQ LQ WKH HFRQRP\  ?:  DQG VRPH FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV EHWZHHQ WKHP :f  WKHQ
L WKH GLUHFW HIIHFW RI D 08 LV WR UDLVH WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP LQ DOO FRXQWULHV
LL WKH GLUHFW HIIHFW RI WKH 08 RQ WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP LV JUHDWHU LQ VPDOOHU FRXQWULHV27
LLL WKH GLUHFWHIIHFWRI WKH 08 RQ WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP LVJUHDWHU LQ FRXQWULHV FKDUDFWHUL]HG
E\ LQWHUPHGLDWH OHYHOV RI FHQWUDOL]DWLRQ RI ZDJH EDUJDLQLQJ ? DQG RI ODERU PDUNHW
FRPSHWLWLYHQHVV 
The ¿rst result states that, in the absence of inÀation aversion on the part of unions and
provided there is more than one union in the economy, the formation of a MU unambiguously
increases real wages (and hence inÀation and unemployment). This effect is triggered by
the GHFUHDVH in the moderating inÀuence that the DGYHUVH FRPSHWLWLYH HIIHFW described
in Proposition 3, has on unions’ wage demands. Basically, in a MU each labor union
internalizes the inÀationary impact of its individual actions, and of the associated deterioration
in competitiveness, to a lesser extent. This induces each union to adopt a more aggressive
wage strategy, which, in equilibrium, results in higher real wage premia in DOO countries.
The proposition also shows that the impact of a MU varies with some structural features
of the country that joins the union. The direct effect of joining a MU on a country’s real wage
increases as the size, r￿, of the country in the MU decreases. The intuition is that the smaller
a country is, in relation to the whole union, the larger will be the relative change in size that
its labor unions experience as a result of membership in the MU.
25 Since unions in a smaller
country internalize the repercussions of their actions on the MU rate of inÀa t i o nt oal e s s e r
extent, their wage-setting strategy becomes more aggressive to a greater extent than that of
larger countries. This suggests that the adverse “real” effects of the European Monetary Union
could be largest in “small” countries, such as Austria and the Netherlands.
Finally, the proposition states that the effect of the MU is largest at intermediate levels
of centralization and of labor market competition (as measured by the labor substitutability
parameter, ). The reason is that when either ? or  is large, labor market performance
converges towards the competitive, market-clearing level, irrespective of the monetary regime
(see Propositions 1 and 2). At the other extreme, when ? 'or  'fthe degree of
competition in the labor market is zero therefore the monetary regime does not affect the
wage premium because the DGYHUVH FRPSHWLWLYH HIIHFW does not operate. Hence, the largest
direct effect of the MU occurs in countries with intermediate levels of centralization of wage
bargaining and of labor substitutability.
58 Each union is concerned with the relative size of its nominal wages with respect to the aggregate nominal
wage to which the central bank responds (equation (7)). The formation of the MU affects the latter variable.28
 7ZR DOWHUQDWLYH LQVWLWXWLRQDO VFHQDULRV
This section examines the sensitivity of the results to variations in some of our
institutional assumptions. In particular, we bring the analysis one step closer to the European
situation by studying the effects of the MU under two alternative institutional scenarios that
may be relevant for Europe. First, we consider the possibility that before joining the MU
some European countries had already subjugated their monetary policies to that of Germany
through the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In this scenario, Germany, the anchor country,
conducts its monetary policy independently of developments in the other countries, and the
central banks of those countries make a unilateral commitment to mimic German monetary
policy.
Second, we modify the Nash wage bargaining framework that we used earlier to allow
for wage-leadership by the unions of a given country (i.e. we solve a Stackelberg game). This
variationismeant to approximate asituationin which some unionsarewage leadersand others
are followers. The leaders set their wages taking into consideration the wage reaction of the
followers who, for their part, take the wages of the leaders as given. This framework may
indicate how the existence of some large trade unions with a history of wage leadership, such
as IGM in Germany, affects economic performance in the EMU.
26
5.1 7KH GLUHFW HIIHFWV RI VZLWFKLQJ IURP D FUHGLEOH (50 WR WKH 08
We model the ERM regime as an asymmetric mechanism where the central bank
of Germany (the anchor country) conducts its monetary policy independently, focusing on
domestic conditions, while the central banks of the other countries precommit to follow the
German inÀation rate. In practice, several European countries attempted to reduce inÀation
towards the lower German rates by joining the ERM, i.e. by stipulating some form of
exchange-rate precommitment with Germany. Therefore, by characterizing membership in
the ERM as a “direct” precommitment to German inÀation by the participating countries, we
are implicitly assuming that the ERM exchange rate commitment is fully credible.
27
59 Similar exercises are developed by Grüner and Hefeker (1999) and Soskice and Iversen (1998). As dis-
cussed in the introduction, one important difference in comparison to their models is that we abandon the as-
sumption of a single monopoly union and of identical countries.
5: Obviously, a precise formalization of the ERMrequiresthe use ofa model with foreigntrade andexchange29
Under this characterization of the monetary regime, monetary policy in Germany in the
pre-MU period is described by the NMP regime that was presented in Section 2, so that the
equilibrium wage premium is given by equation (13). The crucial difference introduced by
the existence of a credible ERM in the pre-MU period concerns the unions of the countries
that precommitted to follow German monetary policy. For those unions domestic inÀation is
unrelated to their wage premia, because they know that domestic inÀation is determined by
the German CB, which looks RQO\ at developments in Germany. This implies that each union
in the “other” ERM countries (subscript “other”) perceives that its individual actions have no
impact on the rate of inÀation (i.e. that YZ
Y￿￿cJ|￿eo 'fimplying ~J|￿eo ' ). Hence the wage
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which is larger than the premium obtained under NMP.
28 The fact that under a credible
ERM the unions in the “other” countries do not internalize the impact of their actions on
inÀation eliminates a deterrent to high wage claims and therefore leads unions to adopt a more
aggressive wage strategy.
This simple reformulation of the model suggests that, other things being equal,
unemployment should belowerin the anchor country than in the“other” countries in the ERM.
Soskice and Iversen (1998), who consider a similar characterization of the ERM, suggest that
this prediction is “clearly borne out empirically in the period from 1983 to 1992 (p. 120)”.
Note, however, that the expression for the wage premium suggests that one should also control
for differences across countries in the degree of centralization, labor substitutability and
unions’ preferences. For instance, if the labor market structure in one of the “other” countries
is highly decentralized (high ?) or highly competitive because of high labor substitutability
(high ), or both, the unemployment rate in that country could be lower than in the anchor
country.
rates. On the other hand, if the exchange rate precommitment is not credible, each country essentially follows
a discretionary policy. But in this case the appropriate characterization of the pre-MU period is provided by the
NMP regime analyzed in Section 2.
5; This follows from the observation that the wage premium is increasing in ] (see equation 13).30
Keeping this quali¿cation in mind, it is of interest to focus on the effects of the MU in
the case of identical countries as a simple benchmark case. The essential difference between
the ERM and the MU is that in the latter inÀation is determined by a central bank that reacts to
area-wide economic variables, whereas the Bundesbank reacted only to German variables.
Under this characterization, the creation of a MU should increase the wage premium of
German unions and decrease the premia of unions in “other” countries. The reason is that the
creation of a MU UHGXFHV the perceived impact of each individual German union on inÀation
whereas the opposite happens in the “other” countries, whose unions now correctly realize
that their wage decisions have a non-zero impact on the inÀationary reaction of the monetary
union’s CB. This moderates wage demands by the unions of the “other” countries.
5.2 7KH HIIHFWV RI ZDJH OHDGHUVKLS E\ D FRXQWU\ LQ WKH 08
Wage setting in several European countries was often characterized by wage leadership
on the part of a major union, with other unions acting as followers. In Germany, for instance,
the metalworkers’ union (IG metall) played a leadership roleYLV j YLVthe other unions. Soskice
and Iversen (1998) report that between 1974 and 1994 IGM set the norm for wage increases
in 15 out of 21 bargaining rounds. It is therefore interesting to examine how the existence of
leading unions may alter macro outcomes in a MU. A full analysis of this case would require
incorporating the possibility that there are, within HDFK country in the MU, ERWK leaders and
followers. For reason of brevity we present a less ambitious analysis in which all unions in
one country are Stackelberg leaders in wage setting and all unions of the other country are
Stackelberg followers. Although less general, this speci¿cation makes it possible to capitalize
on some of the earlier results and still obtain insights into some of the differences in macro
outcomes between a MU in which all unions move simultaneously and a MU in which some
act as wage leaders. It may also be of independent interest to the extent that the unions of a
large country, such as Germany, develop a wage leadership position in the future.
To differentiate between leaders and followers we extend the timing structure to three
stages. In the ¿rst stage the unions of Country 1 that are the wage leaders set their nominal
wages. The negotiated wages are observed and taken as given by the unions of Country 2
when they set their nominal wages in the second stage. In the third stage, after observing
the negotiated area-wide wages, monetary policy is chosen by the central bank of the MU.31
The game is solved by backward induction. In the last stage, monetary policy responds to the
negotiated wages according to the reaction function (21). In the second stage, the unions of
Country 2 set their nominal wages taking as given the nominal wages of unions in Country 1.
This leads to the following reaction function of the average QRPLQDO wages in Country 2 to
Country 1 wages:
2 'X ￿ nX 2 ￿ (31)
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Equation (31) is obtained from the ¿rst order condition of a typical union in Country
2, after aggregating over all unions. This reaction function is the QRPLQDO ZDJH counterpart
of the reaction function between the real wage premia (equation 22) presented in Section 3.
29
Despite its cumbersome algebraic form, equation (31) has a simple interpretation. The slope
coef¿cient X2 shows how nominal wages in Country 2 react to increases in the nominal wages
of Country 1 (i.e. Y￿2
Y￿￿). Even in the simple case in which unions do not care about inÀation
( 'f ), it appears that nominal wages are linked, since if unions in Country 1 increase their
wages, inÀation will increase, and so unions in Country 2 scale up their wages accordingly in
order to maintain the real value of their wages.
30 More generally, when  is not equal to zero,
the sign of X2 depends on the size of . This is summarized in the following:






Y￿￿  X2  f( RWKHUZLVH
Y￿2
Y￿￿  X2 : f
The dependence on  of the sign of the response of country’s 2 nominal wages to an
increase in country’s 1 nominal wages is due to the fact that this increase triggers two opposite
5< If expressed in real terms, expression (31) yields equation (22). Obviously, this is true only for the unions
of Country 2, which take Country 1 wages as given both under simultaneous bargaining and under Country 1
wage leadership.
63 Note that when E @3there is no link between the UHDO wages of the two countries (see equation (22)) but
QRPLQDO wages are still linked (see equation 31).32
effects on nominal wages in Country 2. On one hand, owing to their inÀation aversion,
country’s 2 unions are willing to take a cut in real wages in order to moderate the inÀationary
response of the CB to the increase in the nominal wages of Country 1. On the other hand, they
also wish at least partly to protect their real wages in the face of the higher subsequent inÀation
triggered by the response of the CB to the increase in Country’s 1 nominal wages. If unions’
inÀa t i o na v e r s i o ni ss u f ¿ ciently high (  A the ¿rst effect dominates, and an increase
in Country’s 1 nominal wages leads unions in Country 2 to reduce their nominal wages in
order to avoid excessive inÀation by the CB of the MU. When unions’ inÀation aversion is
not suf¿ciently high (	 A), the desire to avoid an excessive reduction in the real wage
dominates and nominal wages in Country 2 go up. But the increase in the nominal wage in
this case is OHVV than proportional.
31
Let us now consider the ¿rst stage of the game in which the leading unions choose
their wages. Each union in Country 1 sets its nominal wage taking account of the reaction of
nominal wages in Country 2 and of the monetary policy reaction function (equations (31) and
(21), respectively). The ¿rst order condition of the typical union problem in Country 1 implies
the following reaction function of the average wage premium in Country 1 to the average wage
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It appears that the reaction function for the wage premium in equation (32) is analogous
to the expression obtained under simultaneous wage bargaining with the crucial difference
that ~L
￿ is now replaced by ~u
￿ .
32 This captures the essential difference between the two
scenarios. Under wage leadership, the unions of Country 1 internalize the impact of their wage
64 Since 5 ? 4> nominal wages in Country 2 respond to nominal wages in Country 1 less than proportion-
ally. This con¿rms that the UHDO wage premia are strategic substitutes, as shown in subsection 3.1.
65 The reaction function of Country 2 wage premium to Country 1 is unchanged by the assumption of lead-
ership, because the unions of Country 2 (i.e. the followers) take Country 1 wages as given under both scenarios.




4 is given by equation (22).33
decisions on inÀation to a different extent than under simultaneous bargaining. This happens
because they do not take nominal wages in Country 2 as given, but rather take account of
the reaction of those wages to their own wage decisions.
33 If this reaction is positive (i.e.
if
Y￿2
Y￿￿  X2 : f), then each union in Country 1 perceives a higher impact of its nominal
wage choice on inÀation, and hence a lower impact on the real wage (a lower ~). The
following proposition summarizes the effects of wage leadership on the equilibrium real wage
as compared to a MU with simultaneous wage bargaining (the proof appears in the appendix):
Proposition 8 ,I WKH XQLRQV RI &RXQWU\  DUH ZDJH OHDGHUV YLV j YLV WKH XQLRQV RI &RXQWU\ 
WKHQ LQ FRPSDULVRQ WR WKH EHQFKPDUN RI D 08 LQ ZKLFK DOO XQLRQV PRYH VLPXOWDQHRXVO\
L LI 	 AXQLRQV¶ LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ LV QRW VXI¿FLHQWO\ KLJK WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP RI
WKH XQLRQV WKDW DUH OHDGHUV LV ORZHU DQG WKDW RI WKH IROORZHUV LV KLJKHU
LL LI : AXQLRQV¶ LQÀDWLRQ DYHUVLRQ LV VXI¿FLHQWO\ KLJK WKH UHVXOWV LQ SDUW L DUH
UHYHUVHG
LLL ZKHQ  ' A WKHUH LV QR GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH ZDJH SUHPLD XQGHU VLPXOWDQHRXV
EDUJDLQLQJ DQG XQGHU ZDJH OHDGHUVKLS
The origin of dependence of results on the size of  is related to Remark 1 and to the
discussion that follows it. We saw there that, depending on whether their desire to maintain
their real wage in the face of higher inÀation is greater or lesser than their desire to moderate
this inÀation, unions in Country 2 respond by raising or lowering their nominal wages. When
the ¿rst effect dominates, unions in Country 1 internalize the consequences of their wage
decisions for inÀation to a larger extent than under simultaneous bargaining because they are
aware of the fact that the inÀationary reaction of the MU central bank will be magni¿ed by the
response of the unions in Country 2 to their own wage decisions. This tends to moderate their
wage demands. On the other hand, when the inÀation aversion of the followers is suf¿ciently
large, the leading unions have more leeway for higher wage demands, since they know that
some of the inÀationary consequences of their actions will be offset by the decrease in the real
wage of the (strongly inÀation-averse) follower unions of Country 2.
66 Technically, undersimultaneousmoves g￿










and overall unemployment in the area. In particular, equation (24) suggests that the higher is
the average wage premium the higher are those area-wide variables.
34 It is therefore useful to
know whether the average wage premium in the MU is larger under wage leadership or under
simultaneous bargaining. The following two propositions address this issue.
Proposition 9 8QGHU ZDJH OHDGHUVKLS WKH DYHUDJH ZDJH SUHPLXP LQ WKH 08 DQG WKH DYHUDJH
ZDJH SUHPLXP RI WKH OHDGLQJ XQLRQV DUH SRVLWLYHO\ UHODWHG
The proof appears in the appendix. An immediate consequence of the preceding two
propositions is:
Proposition 10 L ,I 	 A LQÀDWLRQ XQHPSOR\PHQW DQG WKH DYHUDJH OHYHO RI UHDO ZDJHV
LQ WKH 08 DUH ORZHU XQGHU ZDJH OHDGHUVKLS WKDQ XQGHU VLPXOWDQHRXV EDUJDLQLQJ
LL ,I : A LQÀDWLRQ XQHPSOR\PHQW DQG WKH DYHUDJH OHYHO RI UHDO ZDJHV LQ WKH 08
DUH KLJKHU XQGHU ZDJH OHDGHUVKLS WKDQ XQGHU VLPXOWDQHRXV EDUJDLQLQJ
LLL ,I  ' A LQÀDWLRQ XQHPSOR\PHQW DQG WKH DYHUDJH OHYHO RI UHDO ZDJHV LQ WKH 08
DUH WKH VDPH XQGHU ZDJH OHDGHUVKLS DQG XQGHU VLPXOWDQHRXV EDUJDLQLQJ
We conclude this subsection with an analysis of how the response of the followers to a
change in the nominal wage of the leaders depends on the bargaining structure within the MU.
The following observation concerning the reaction of Country 2 wages to wages in Country 1
provides an intermediate step:
Remark 2 7KH FURVVSDUWLDO GHULYDWLYH Y2￿2
Y?2Y￿￿ LV SRVLWLYH LH Y￿2





Proposition 11 $V WKH ZDJH EDUJDLQLQJ VWUXFWXUH LQ WKH ³IROORZHU´ FRXQWU\ EHFRPHV PRUH
GHFHQWUDOL]HG WKH ZDJH SUHPLXP LQ WKH ³OHDGHU´ FRXQWU\ GHFUHDVHV







l @4 >5is the average wage premium in country l in the presence of wage leadership.35
This means that the largest moderating effect on the unions of the leader country occurs
if the labor market structure in the “follower” country is highly decentralized. The reason is
that in this case the unions of the leader country cannot rely on the inÀation aversion of the
followers to offset (in part) the consequences of their own wage demands on the subsequent
inÀationary response of the CB. As a result, the unions in the leader country internalize the
inÀationary consequences of their wage decisions to a larger extent. This leads to more wage
moderation on their part.
 &RQFOXGLQJ 5HPDUNV
This paper presents a strategic analysis of how the establishment of a monetary union
(MU) is likely to alter wage setting behavior under alternative institutional scenarios and
through it macroeconomic performance. The paper highlights the effects of the formation
of a MU that operate via the change in unions’ incentives for wage moderation. The analysis
abstracts from other changes that might be associated with the establishment of a MU, such as
changesinthedegreeofthecentralbank(CB)inÀationaversionorinthedegreeofcompetition
in the labor market. The virtue of this simple approach is to show that, in the presence of
suf¿ciently large unions (i.e. non-atomistic), several neutrality results that would be expected
on the basis of traditional analysis no longer hold.
The main lesson of the paper is that, in spite of the fact that agents have rational
expectations and complete information, the change in the strategic interaction between unions
and the CB caused by MU leads to changes in equilibrium values of real variables. This
occurs only when unions are non-atomistic and thus partly internalize the repercussions of
their own actions on other agents’ decisions (the CB and other unions). It is noteworthy that
the formation of a MU induces changes in real wages, unemployment and inÀation even when
all parameters of the game (CB and unions’ preferences, number of unions and labor market
competitiveness) remain unchanged by the MU. A basic mechanism driving those results is
thattheformationofaMUunambiguouslyreduceseachunion’sperceptionofhowinÀationary
its individual actions are. This happens because in the MU each union is relatively smaller
compared with the pre-MU situation. When a typical union is concerned about inÀation, this
reduced inÀationary perception leads the union to demand a higher wage premium, increasing36
unemployment and inÀation. A similar effect of the MU is presented in Grüner and Hefeker
(1999). However, since in their model there is a single monopoly union in each country, the
real effects of the MU hinge on the assumption that unions are inÀation averse. Our analysis
generalizes their result by demonstrating that in a multi-union world the establishment of a
MU has real repercussions even when unions are QRW averse to inÀation. This second type of
non-neutrality is due to the fact that, when wages are bargained in nominal terms, the degree
of inÀation aversion of the central bank affects each union’s perception of how costly it is, in
terms of reduced competitiveness, to increase its individual wage.
35
As mentioned, a central proposition of the paper is that the MU may lead to more
aggressive wage behavior, and hence to higher unemployment in the participating countries,
providedunionsarenon-atomistic. Anumberofquali¿cationstothis propositionarediscussed
in the paper. First, when the degree of competition in labor markets differs across countries,
the effects of MU on unemployment may be distributed asymmetrically. In particular, the
formation of a MU leads to a larger increase in unemployment in the country in which the
labor market is less competitive, and may even decrease unemployment in the other country.
Second, the formation of a MU always increases unemployment if unions are not inÀation
averse, and the increase is greater in smaller countries and greatest at intermediate levels of
centralization and of labor market competitiveness.
Finally, the paper examines the robustness of the results to two alternative institutional
scenarios which may be relevant for Europe. The ¿rst scenario recognizes that several
European countries, which belonged to the ERM, were already committed to German
monetary policy prior to joining the MU. Under the assumption that this commitment was
credible, the analysis predicts that with the adoption of the MU the unemployment problem
may become more serious in Germany (the pre MU anchor country) and less serious in the
satellite countries. In the second scenario we study how wage-leadership by the unions of one
country alters macro performance in the MU compared with a case in which all unions in the
MU move simultaneously. The analysis suggests that if unions’ inÀation aversion is not “too
high”, the MU average wage premium, as well as that of the unions in the “leader” country,
are lower than the corresponding premia in a MU with simultaneous bargaining. Moreover,
68 See the discussion after Proposition 3. Cukierman and Lippi (1999) discuss this second mechanism in
details. Lippi (1999) shows that a related non-neutrality effect appears in a model of imperfect competition of the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) variety, if unions are non-atomistic and wages are bargained in nominal terms.37
the moderating effect on average wage demands in the MU, as well as on the wages of unions
in the “leader” country, are larger when the labor market structure in the “follower” country is
highly decentralized.
Our model can in principle be used to analyze how the MU affects policymakers’
incentives to reform the labor market. This issue is relevant for Europe, where labor market
rigidities are considered by many an important determinant of poor employment performance
(Bean, 1994 Nickell, 1997). Sibert and Sutherland (1998) have recently used a variant
of the Barro-Gordon model to analyze this question. In their model monetary policy is
discretionary and policymakers face an inÀationary bias that is directly proportional to the
rate of unemployment. Moreover, owing to international spillovers, inÀation is higher when
monetary policy is implemented in a uncoordinated manner (i.e. NMP) than in the MU.
Policymakers have an incentive to reduce labor market distortions, because this lowers the
equilibrium rate of unemployment and hence of inÀation. A main point of their paper is that,
since inÀation in the MU is lower than under NMP, the incentives to eliminate labor market
distortions are lower in the MU than under NMP.
36 This result hinges on the assumption that
the MU does not have a direct effect on the unemployment rate. In this paper we showed that
this may not be the case. If the MU has a direct positive effect on the unemployment rate,
this should, in the light of Sibert and Sutherland model, increase policymakers’ incentives
for reform. This seems to mitigate the lower incentives for reforms identi¿ed by the above-
mentioned authors. A thorough investigation of this issue could be the subject of a separate
paper.
69 A similar hypothesis is advanced by Calmfors (1998).$SSHQGL[
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￿ and ML
￿ :M ￿
￿The term in the rightmost square bracket of
expression (33) is positive. Hence the expression can only be negative if the term in the
curly bracket is suf¿ciently negative. For the term in the curly bracket to be negative, the
term in the ¿rst square bracket needs to be negative, which occurs only if ￿ is suf¿ciently
larger than 2. Thus, for a suf¿ciently large difference between ￿ and 2 the sign of the
¿rst square bracket of equation is negative. Given this, for a suf¿ciently large  the whole
expression is negative.




2 is always positive if
￿ : 2.
3URRI RI 3URSRVLWLRQ  The direct effect of the MU in country  when unions do not care
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k 2n U It appears that the difference ￿ is positive
for all ?:and :f . This proves part i.
Part (ii): This follows immediately from the sign of the partial derivative:
Y￿￿
Yr￿c which is
smaller than zero over the parameters’d o m a i n .


















































where ( is the product of the terms in the square brackets in the denominator of (34).
Algebraic analysis of (35) (and of (36)) reveals that: the expression is: continuous in ?
()f o r?:E :fc larger than zero at ? ' E 'f  cnegative for a suf¿ciently
large ? E and converging towards zero from below as ? $4 E $4  Since both
expressions switch from a positive to a negative sign only once as ? and  increase, it
follows that the difference ￿ has a unique global maximum at intermediate values of ? and
of This proves part LLL.
3URRI RI 3URSRVLWLRQ  The reaction function of Country 2 unions to Country 1 unions,
expressed in terms of average real wage premia, is given by equation (22) and is unaffected
by whether wage bargaining is characterized by simultaneous moves or by leadership. Now
turn to Country 1 reaction function to country’ s2a v e r a g ep r e m i u m ,g i v e nb y( 3 2 ) .N o t e
that when  ' A, ~u
￿ =~L
￿ so that country’s 1 reaction function under leadership is
identical to its reaction function under simultaneous bargaining. Hence, when  ' A the
equilibrium wage premia under leadership and under simultaneous bargaining are identical.
This establishes part (iii) of the proposition.
More generally, when  9' A, the only difference from the preceding case is that the
value of ~￿ in the reaction function of the leaders is ~u
￿ rather than ~L
￿ . It follows that the
equilibrium average wage premium of the group of leading unions is still given by equation
(23) with ~L
￿ replaced by ~u
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(37)
where M￿  kEk~￿ n ￿E?￿   for any value of ~￿. Differentiating (37) with respect






















































and  is the denominator of the expression in (37). Since ~L
2 and ~￿ are bounded between
zero and one, and since ?￿ @ cthe expression in equation (38) is positive so that the
average wage premium of the leading unions is a monotonically increasing function of ~￿.
The proof of parts (i) and (ii) for the unions of Country 1 follows by noting, from Remark
1, that ~u
￿ i ss m a l l e ro rl a r g e rt h a n~ L
￿ depending on whether X2 is positive or negative,
which depends in turn on whether  is smaller or larger than A. The proof of parts (i) and
(ii) for the average premium of the unions in Country 2 follows by recalling, from equation
(22), that the two wage premia are strategic substitutes.
3URRI RI 3URSRVLWLRQ  The average wage premium in the MU under the wage leadership



























2 are respectively the area wide average wage premium and the average
wage premia in countries 1 and 2 when the unions of Country 1 are wage leaders. The
second equality follows from equation (22) and from the fact that the reaction function of
Country 2 unions is the same under simultaneous bargaining and under wage leadership by
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